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Abstract
Default logic can be regarded as a mechanism to represent families of belief sets of a reasoning agent.
As such, it is inherently second-order. In this paper, we study the problem of representability of a
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1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the issues related to the expressibility of default logic, a knowl-
edge representation formalism introduced by Reiter [Rei80] and extensively investigated by
the researchers of logical foundations of Artificial Intelligence [Eth88, Bes89, Bre91]. A
default theory ∆ describes a family (possibly empty) of belief sets of an agent reasoning
with ∆. In that, default logic is inherently second-order, but in a sense different from that
used by logicians. Whereas a logical theory S describes a subset of the set of all formulas
(specifically, the set Cn(S) of logical consequences of S), a default theory ∆ describes a
collection of subsets of the set of all formulas, namely the family of all extensions of ∆,
ext(∆). Hence, default theories can be viewed as encodings of families of subsets of some
universe described by a propositional language. Examples of encodings of the problems of
existence of colorings, kernels, and hamilton cycles in graphs are given in [CMMT95].
This second-order flavor of default logic makes it especially useful in knowledge repre-
sentation. An important question, then, is to characterize those families of sets that can
be represented as the set of extensions of a certain default theory. This is the topic of our
paper.
There is a constraint on the family T of extensions of a default theory ∆. Namely such
family must be non-including [Rei80]. In this paper we exhibit several classes of families of
non-including theories that can be represented by default theories. We also show that there
are non-representable families of non-including theories. The existential proof follows easily
from a cardinality argument. There are continuum-many default theories in a given (de-
numerable) language, while there is more than continuum-many families of non-including
theories. In the paper, we actually construct a family of non-including theories that is not
represented by a default theory. Moreover, our family is denumerable (the cardinality argu-
ment mentioned above does not guarantee the existence of a non-representable denumerable
family of non-including theories).
The family of extensions of a normal default theory is not only non-including, but all its
members are pairwise inconsistent [Rei80]. In this paper, we fully characterize these families
of theories which are of the form ext(∆), for a normal default theory ∆. In addition, we
construct examples of denumerable families of pairwise inconsistent theories which are not
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representable by normal default theories.
Let T = ext(∆), for some default theory ∆. Clearly, there are other default theories
∆′ such that ext(∆′) = T . In other words, ∆ is not uniquely determined by T . Thus,
it is natural to search for alternative default theories ∆′ with the same set of extensions
as ∆. Let us call ∆′ equivalent to ∆ if ext(∆) = ext(∆′). We show that for every ∆ we
can effectively (without constructing extensions of ∆) find an equivalent theory ∆′ with all
defaults in D′ prerequisite-free (this result was obtained independently by Schaub [Sch92],
and Bonatti and Eiter [BE95]). An important feature of our approach is that it shows that
when ∆ is normal, we can construct a normal prerequisite-free default theory ∆′ equivalent
to ∆.
We also present results that allow us to replace some normal theories ∆ with equivalent
normal default theories of the form (D′, ∅). At present, it is an open problem to decide
whether such replacement is possible for every normal default theory ∆ with W consistent.
We discuss yet another (weaker) form of equivalence and prove that every normal default
theory is equivalent to a theory closely related to the closed world assumption over a certain
set of atoms.
This paper sheds some light on the issue of expressibility of default logic and, in par-
ticular, on expressibility of normal default logic. We firmly believe that the success of
default logic as a knowledge representation mechanism depends on a deeper understanding
of expressibility issues.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper, by L we denote a language of propositional logic with a denumerable set of
atoms At. By a theory we always mean a subset of L closed under propositional provability.
Let B be a set of standard monotone inference rules. The formal system obtained by
extending propositional calculus with the rules from B will be denoted by PC + B. The
corresponding provability operator will be denoted by ⊢B and the consequence operator by
CnB(·) [MT93].
A default is an expression d of the form α:Γ
β
, where α and β are formulas from L and
Γ is a finite subset of L. The formula α is called the prerequisite, formulas in Γ — the
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justifications, and β — the consequent of d. The prerequisite, the set of justifications and
the consequent of a default d are denoted by p(d), j(d) and c(d), respectively. If p(d) is a
tautology, d is called prerequisite-free (p(d) is then usually omitted from the notation of d).
This terminology is naturally extended to a set of defaults D.
By a default theory we mean a pair ∆ = (D,W ), where D is a set of defaults and W is
a set of formulas, is called a default theory. A default theory ∆ = (D,W ) is called finite if
both D and W are finite. For a set of defaults D, define
Mon(D) =
{
p(d)
c(d)
: d ∈ D
}
.
A default d (a set of defaults D) is applicable with respect to a theory S (is S-applicable) if
S 6⊢ ¬γ for every γ ∈ j(d) (j(D), respectively). Let D be a set of defaults. By the reduct
DS of D with respect to S we mean the set of monotone inference rules:
DS =Mon({d ∈ D: d is S-applicable}).
A theory S is an extension4 of a default theory (D,W ) if and only if
S = CnDS(W ).
The family of all extensions of (D,W ) is denoted by ext(D,W ).
A family T of subsets of L is non-including if:
1. each T ∈ T is closed under propositional consequence, and
2. T is an antichain, that is, for every T, T ′ ∈ T , if T ⊆ T ′ then T = T ′.
Let S be a theory. A default d is generating for S if d is S-applicable and p(d) ∈ S. The
set of all defaults in D generating for S is denoted by GD(D,S). It is well-known [MT93]
that
(P1) If S is an extension of (D,W ) then S = Cn(W ∪ c(GD(D,S))),
(P2) If all defaults in D are prerequisite-free then S is an extension of (D,W ) if and only
if S = Cn(W ∪ c(GD(D,S))).
4Our definition of extension is different from but equivalent to the original definition by Reiter. See
[MT93] for details.
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We will define now the key concepts of the paper.
Definition 2.1 Default theories ∆ and ∆′ are equivalent if ext(∆) = ext(∆′).
Definition 2.2 Let ∆ be a default theory over a language L and let ∆′ be a default theory
over a language L′ such that L ⊆ L′. Theory ∆ is semi-equivalent to ∆′ if ext(∆) =
{T ∩ L:T ∈ ext(∆′)}.
Definition 2.3 Let T be a family of theories contained in L. The family T is representable
by a default theory ∆ if ext(∆) = T .
3 Default theories without normality restriction
We start with the result that allows us to replace any default theory with an equivalent
default theory in which all defaults are prerequisite-free. As mentioned, this result was
known before. However, our argument shows that if we start with a normal default theory,
its prerequisite-free equivalent replacement can also be chosen to be normal.
Theorem 3.1 For every default theory ∆ there is a prerequisite-free default theory ∆′ equiv-
alent to ∆. Moreover, if ∆ is normal then ∆′ can be chosen to be normal, too.
Proof: Let ∆ = (D,W ). By a quasi-proof from D and W we mean any proof from W in
the system PC +Mon(D). For every quasi-proof ǫ from D and W let Dǫ be the set of all
defaults used in ǫ. For each such proof ǫ, define
dǫ =
: j(Dǫ)∧
cons(Dǫ)
.
Next, define
E = {dǫ: ǫ is a quasi-proof from W}.
Each default in E is prerequisite-free. Put ∆′ = (E,W ). We will show that ∆′ has exactly
the same extensions as (D,W ). To this end, we will show that for every theory S and for
every formula ϕ,
W ⊢DS ϕ iff W ⊢ES ϕ.
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Assume first that W ⊢DS ϕ. Then, there is a quasi-proof ǫ of ϕ such that all defaults in Dǫ
are applicable with respect to S. Moreover, W ∪ c(Dǫ) ⊢ ϕ. Observe that c(dǫ) ⊢ c(Dǫ).
Since dǫ is prerequisite-free and S-applicable, W ⊢ES W ∪ c(Dǫ). Hence, W ⊢ES ϕ.
To prove the converse implication, observe that since all defaults in E are prerequisite-
free,
{ϕ:W ⊢ES ϕ} = Cn(W ∪ c(ES)).
Hence, it is enough to show that
W ⊢DS W ∪ c(ES).
Clearly, for every ϕ ∈ W , W ⊢DS ϕ. Consider then ϕ ∈ c(ES). It follows that there
is a quasi-proof ǫ such that dǫ is S-applicable and c(dǫ) = ϕ. Consequently, all defaults
occurring in ǫ are S-applicable. Thus, for every default d ∈ Dǫ,
W ⊢DS c(d).
Since ϕ =
∧
c(Dǫ),
W ⊢DS ϕ.
To prove the claim for normal default theories, observe that if each default in D is
normal, then each default in E is of the form
: Γ∧
Γ
.
Let Ê be a set of defaults obtained from E by replacing each default :Γ∧
Γ
by the normal
default
:
∧
Γ∧
Γ
. It is easy to see that S is an extension of (E,W ) if and only if S is an
extension of (Ê,W ). ✷
The next result fully characterizes families of theories representable by default theories
with a finite set of defaults.
Theorem 3.2 The following statements are equivalent:
(i) T is representable by a default theory (D,W ) with finite D
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(ii) T is a finite set of non-including theories, finitely generated over the intersection of
T
Proof: Assume (i). Since every extension of (D,W ) is of the form Cn(W ∪ c(D′)), for some
D′ ⊆ D, it follows that ext(D,W ) is finite. It is also well-known ([Rei80, MT93]) that
ext(D,W ) is non-including. Let U be the intersection of all theories in ext(D,W ). Then
W ⊆ U . Consequently, each extension in ext(D,W ) is of the form Cn(U ∪ c(D′)). Hence,
each extension is finitely generated over the intersection of ext(D,W ).
Now, assume (ii). Let U be the intersection of all theories in T . It follows that there
is a positive integer k and formulas ϕ1, . . . , ϕk such that T = {T1, . . . , Tk} and each Ti =
Cn(U ∪ {ϕi}).
Assume first that k = 1. Then, it is evident that T is the family of extensions of the
default theory (∅, T1). Hence, assume that k ≥ 2. Since the theories in T are non-including,
for every j 6= i we have
U ∪ {ϕi} 6⊢ ϕj. (1)
In particular, each theory in T is consistent and so is U . Moreover, it follows from (1) that
for every j = 1, . . . , k,
U 6⊢ ϕj . (2)
Define
di =
: {¬ϕ1, . . . ,¬ϕi−1,¬ϕi+1, . . . ,¬ϕk}
ϕi
,
i = 1, . . . , k. Next, define D = {d1, . . . , dk}. We will show that ext(D,U) = T .
Let T be an extension of (D,U). Then, there is a subset Φ of {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk} such that
T = Cn(U∪Φ). Assume that |Φ| = 0. Then, by (2), DT = {
:
ϕi
: i = 1, . . . , k}. Consequently,
U = T = CnDT (U) = Cn(U ∪ {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk}). Hence, for every i, U ⊢ ϕi, a contradiction
(with (2)). Hence, |Φ| > 0. Assume that |Φ| > 1. By the definition of D, DT = ∅.
Consequently, T = Cn(U ∪Φ) = CnDT (U) = Cn(U). Let ϕ ∈ Φ (recall that Φ 6= ∅). Then,
U ⊢ ϕ, a contradiction. Hence, every extension T of (D,W ) is of the form Cn(U ∪ {ϕi})
for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
To complete the proof, consider an arbitrary i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We will show that Ti
is an extension of (D,W ). First, observe that, by (1), DTi = {
:
ϕi
}. Consequently,
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CnDTi (U) = Cn(U ∪ {ϕi}) = Ti. Hence, Ti is an extension of (D,U). ✷
This result and its argument provide the following corollary which gives a complete char-
acterization of families of theories representable by finite default theories, that is, theories
(D,W ) with both D and W finite.
Corollary 3.3 The following statements are equivalent:
1. T is representable by a finite default theory
2. T is a finite set of finitely generated non-including theories
As pointed out in the introduction, the cardinality argument implies the existence of non-
representable families of non-including theories. However, it does not imply the existence of
denumerable non-representable families. We will now show two examples of such families.
The first family consists of non-including finitely generated theories. The second one consists
of mutually inconsistent theories.
Theorem 3.4 There exists a countable family of finitely generated non-including theories
T such that T is not representable by a default theory.
Proof: Let {p0, p1, . . .} be a set of propositional atoms. Define Ti = Cn({pi}), i = 0, 1, . . .,
and T = {Ti: i = 0, 1, . . .}. It is clear that T is countable and consists of non-including
theories. We will show that T is not representable by a default theory.
Assume that T is represented by a default theory (D,W ). By Theorem 3.1, we may
assume that all defaults in D are prerequisite-free. We can also assume that no default in
D contains a justification which is contradictory (such defaults are never used to construct
extensions).
Consider a default d ∈ D. Since j(d) is finite, there is k such that for all m > k, all
formulas in j(d) are consistent with Tm. Since Tm is an extension of (D,W ), c(d) ∈ Tm, for
m > k. Since ⋂
m>k
Tm = Cn(∅),
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c(d) is a tautology. Since d was arbitrary, it follows that (D,W ) possesses only one exten-
sion, namely Cn(W ), a contradiction. ✷
Theorem 3.5 There exists a countable family of mutually inconsistent theories T such that
T is not representable by a default theory. In particular T is not representable by a normal
default theory.
Proof: Let {p0, p1, . . .} be a set of propositional atoms. Define
Ti = Cn({¬pi, pi+1, . . .}),
for i = 0, 1, . . ., and T = {Ti: i = 0, 1, . . .}. It is clear that T is countable and consists of
pairwise inconsistent theories. Now, we apply precisely the same argument as in the proof
of Theorem 3.4. ✷
Our counterexamples have an additional property that their infinite subsets and all
supersets are also counterexamples.
Finally, we show that if infinite sets of justifications are allowed in defaults, every theory
of non-including theories can be represented as the family of extensions.
4 Eliminating extensions
In this section, we consider the problem of representability of subfamilies of a representable
family. We present a technique for constructing default theories representing some subfam-
ilies of a family of extensions of a given default theory ∆. Such techniques are important
when we have to redesign the default theory to exclude extensions containing a specific
formula and preserve all the remaining extensions unchanged.
Let ϕ ∈ L. Define
dϕ =
ϕ :
⊥
.
Theorem 4.1 Let E ⊆ L be consistent and let (D,W ) be a default theory. Then, E is an
extension of (D ∪ {dϕ},W ) if and only if ϕ /∈ E and E is an extension of (D,W ).
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Proof: Since E is consistent,
(D ∪ {dϕ})E = DE ∪ {
ϕ :
⊥
}.
Assume that ϕ /∈ E and that E is an extension of (D,W ). Then
E = CnDE(W )
and ϕ /∈ CnDE(W ). Consequently,
E = CnDE(W ) = CnDE∪{
ϕ
⊥
}(W ) = Cn(D∪{dϕ})E (W ).
Hence, E is an extension of (D ∪ {dϕ},W ).
Conversely, assume that E is an extension of (D ∪ {dϕ},W ). Then,
E = Cn(D∪{dϕ})E (W ) = CnDE∪{
ϕ
⊥
}(W ).
Since E is consistent, it follows that ϕ /∈ CnDE(W ). Consequently,
CnDE(W ) = CnDE∪{
ϕ
⊥
}(W ) = E.
Hence, ϕ /∈ E and E is an extension of (D,W ). ✷
We say that a family F of theories closed under propositional consequence has a strong
system of distinct representatives (SSDR, for short) if for every F ∈ F there is a formula
ϕF ∈ F which does not belong to any other theory in F .
Theorem 4.2 If F is representable by a default theory and has an SSDR, then every family
G ⊆ F is representable by a default theory.
Proof: The claim is obvious if F = {L}. So, assume that all members of F are consistent
(since F is an antichain, there are no other possibilities). Let (D,W ) be a default theory
such that Ext(D,W ) = F . Define
D = D′ ∪ {dϕF :F ∈ F \ G}.
Since all theories in F are consistent, the assertion follows from the definition of an SSDR
and from Theorem 4.1. ✷
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Let us conclude this section with two observations. First, there are families of theo-
ries closed under propositional consequence which possess SSDRs but which are not rep-
resentable by a default theory (the examples presented in the paper have this property).
Second, not every subfamily of a representable family is representable. It follows by the
cardinality argument from the the fact that there are representable families of cardinality
continuum.
5 Normal default theories
Our first result in this section describes the family of extensions of an arbitrary prerequisite-
free normal default theory.
Theorem 5.1 Let W,Ψ ⊆ L. Let D = { :ϕ
ϕ
:ϕ ∈ Ψ}. If W is inconsistent then ext(D,W ) =
{L}. Otherwise, ext(D,W ) is exactly the family of all theories of the form Cn(W∪Φ), where
Φ is a maximal subset of Ψ such that W ∪ Φ is consistent.
Proof: The case of inconsistent W is evident. Hence, let us assume that W is consistent.
Let T be an extension of (D,W ). Since W is consistent, T is consistent, too. Let Φ = {ϕ ∈
Ψ:T 6⊢ ¬ϕ}. Clearly, Φ = c(GD(D,T )). By (P2), T = Cn(W ∪ Φ). Moreover, since T is
consistent, W ∪ Φ is consistent. We will show that Φ is a maximal subset of Ψ with this
property. Let Φ′ be such that Φ ⊆ Φ′ ⊆ Ψ. Assume that W ∪Φ′ is consistent. Then, T ∪Φ′
is consistent. Hence, Φ′ ⊆ Φ and, consequently, Φ = Φ′.
Assume next that T = Cn(W ∪Φ), where Φ is a maximal subset of Ψ such that W ∪Φ
is consistent. Then, it is easy to see that
GD(D,T ) =
{
:ϕ
ϕ
:ϕ ∈ Φ
}
.
Hence, Φ = c(GD(D,T )) and T = Cn(W ∪ c(GD(D,T ))). Since all defaults in D are
prerequisite-free, it follows by the property (P2) that T is an extension of (D,W ). ✷
As a corollary, we obtain a full characterization of families of theories that are repre-
sentable by normal default theories.
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Corollary 5.2 A family T of theories in L is representable by a normal default theory if
and only if T = {L} or there is a consistent set of formulas W and a set of formulas Ψ
such that T = {Cn(W ∪ Φ) : Φ ⊆ Ψ and Φ is maximal so that W ∪ Φ is consistent}.
Proof: By Theorem 3.1, T is representable by a normal default theory if and only if it
is representable by a normal default theory with all defaults prerequisite-free. Hence, the
assertion follows from Theorem 5.1. ✷
Corollary 5.3 A family of theories T is representable by a normal default theory with
empty objective part if and only if there is a set of formulas Ψ such that T = {Cn(Φ) : Φ
is maximal consistent subset of Ψ}. ✷
We will next study the issue of equivalence between normal default theories. We have
already seen that we can replace any normal default theory with an equivalent normal
prerequisite-free one (Theorem 3.1). The problem of interest now will be to establish when
a normal default theory can be replaced by an equivalent normal default theory with empty
objective part. We have only partial answers to this problem.
First, consider a normal default theory (D,W ) such that W is inconsistent. Then
ext(D,W ) = {L}. On the other hand, for every set of normal defaults D′, ext(D′, ∅)
contains only consistent extensions. Hence, (D,W ) is not equivalent to any normal default
theory with empty objective part. From now on we will focus on normal default theories
(D,W ) for which W is consistent.
Theorem 5.4 For every normal default theory (D,W ) with W consistent and finite there
exists a prerequisite-free normal default theory (D′, ∅) equivalent to (D,W ).
Proof: By Theorem 3.1, without loss of generality we can assume that each default in D is
prerequisite-free. Define ω =
∧
W .
First, assume that the justification of every default in D is inconsistent with ω. Then,
ext(D,W ) = {Cn(W )}. Let D′ = { :ω
ω
}. Clearly, ext(D′, ∅) = ext(D,W ).
Hence, assume that there are defaults in D whose justifications are consistent with ω.
For every default d = :β
β
in D, define dω =
:β∧ω
β∧ω . Finally, define D
′ = {dω: d ∈ D}. The
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statement now follows from Theorem 5.1 ✷.
Next, we will study normal default theories of a special form. Let P be a subset of the
set of atoms of the language L. By a P -literal we mean an element of P or the negation of
an element of P . Define
DCOMP
P
=
{
: q
q
: where q is a P -literal
}
.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
A theory T is P -complete if it contains p or ¬p for every p ∈ P . We will now describe
theories representable by default theories of the form (DCOMP
P
,W ).
Proposition 5.5 For every consistent theory W , T is an extension of (DCOMP
P
,W ) if and
only if a theory T is inclusion-minimal among theories which are P -complete and contain
W .
Proof: If T is an extension of (DCOMP
P
,W ) then W ⊆ T . In addition, since exactly one
of every pair :q
q
and :¬q¬q of defaults from D
COMPP is used when constructiong T , T is
P -complete. Let T ′ ⊆ T be P -complete and contain W . It follows that T ′ has exactly the
same P -literals as T . Hence, T = CnD
COMP
P
T (W ) ⊆ T ′ and, consequently, T = T ′.
Conversely, let T be inclusion-minimal P -complete theory such that W ⊆ T . Let TP
be the set of all P -literals in T . Since W is consistent, there exist P -complete, consistent
theories containing W . Therefore all inclusion-minimal P -complete theories containing W
are consistent. Hence, for every atom p ∈ P , exactly one of p and ¬p belongs to TP . It is now
clear that DCOMP
P
T = {
:
q
: q ∈ TP }. Hence, T ⊇ Cn
DCOMP
P
T (W ). Since CnD
COMP
P
T (W ) is
P -complete and contains W , by minimality of T , T = CnD
COMP
P
T (W ). Consequently, T is
an extension of (DCOMP
P
,W ). ✷
Proposition 5.6 Let P be a subset of the set of atoms of L. For every consistent W , the
family TW,P = {T : T is inclusion-minimal among all P -complete theories containing W}
is representable by a normal prerequisite-free default theory with empty-objective part.
Proof: Proposition 5.5 implies that we can represent TW by a default theory (D
COMP,W ).
We will now construct another set of defaults D such that (D, ∅) represents TW .
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If the language L has only a finite number of atoms, we can assume that W is finite.
Hence, the assertion follows from Theorem 5.4. So assume that L has infinite number of
atoms. Let p0, p1, . . . be an enumeration of atoms in L. For the purpose of this proof we
define, for an atom p, 0p = p, 1p = ¬p.
Consider a set treeW of all finite sequences 〈ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn〉 such thatW∪{ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn}
is consistent.
The set treeW forms a tree. That is, if 〈ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn〉 belongs to tree
W and m < n then
also 〈ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫmpm〉 belongs to tree
W .
An infinite branch in treeW determines the infinite sequence 〈ǫ0p0, . . .〉. Since for all
n, W ∪ {ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn} is consistent, Cn({ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn, . . .}) is also consistent. It is also
complete and therefore, as W is consistent with it, W ⊆ Cn({ǫ0p0, . . .}). Conversely, if T is
consistent and complete then there is a sequence 〈ǫ0p0, . . .〉 such that T = Cn({ǫ0p0, . . .}).
If W ⊆ T then for all n, W ∪ {ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn} is consistent. Thus we proved that there is a
one-to-one correspondence between the branches in treeW and complete, consistent theories
containing W .
Now define:
D =
{
: ǫ0p0 ∧ . . . ∧ ǫnpn
ǫ0p0 ∧ . . . ∧ ǫnpn
: 〈ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn〉 ∈ tree
W
}
We show that the extensions of (D, ∅) are precisely the theories of the form Cn({ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn, . . .}),
where 〈ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn, . . .〉 is an infinite branch through tree
W .
Indeed, if 〈ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn, . . .〉 is an infinite branch through tree
W then T = Cn({ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn, . . .})
is a complete theory. The only default rules in D that have conclusions in T are the rules
:ǫ0p0∧...∧ǫnpn
ǫ0p0∧...∧ǫnpn
for n ∈ N . This implies that Cn({ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn, . . .}) is an extension of (D, ∅).
Conversely, if T is an extension of (D, ∅) then if :ǫ0p0∧...∧ǫnpn
ǫ0p0∧...∧ǫnpn
is a generating rule for
T then for all m < n, :ǫ0p0∧...∧ǫnpm
ǫ0p0∧...∧ǫnpm
is also a generating rule for T . Next, since W = ∅, T
must be consistent. This means that if two rules :ǫ0p0∧...∧ǫnpn
ǫ0p0∧...∧ǫnpn
and :δ0p0∧...∧δmpm
δ0p0∧...∧δmpm
are both
generating for T then m ≤ n and δ0 = ǫ0, . . . δm = ǫm or n ≤ m and δ0 = ǫ0, . . . δn = ǫn.
Thus, in order to complete our argument it is enough to show that the set of generating
rules for T is infinite. Assume otherwise. Then, there exists a sequence 〈ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn〉
such that T = Cn({ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn}). But recall that 〈ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn〉 ∈ tree
W . Therefore
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W ∪ {ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn} is consistent and so there is a complete theory T
′ containing W ∪
{ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫnpn}. In particular pn+1 ∈ T
′ or ¬pn+1 ∈ T
′. Without loss of generality assume
that pn+1 (i.e. 0pn+1) belongs to T . Setting ǫn+1 = 0 we have
〈ǫ0p0, . . . , ǫn+1pn+1〉 ∈ tree
W .
Hence, the default rule :ǫ0p0∧...∧ǫn+1pn+1
ǫ0p0∧...∧ǫn+1pn+1
belongs to D. Since T ⊆ T ′, pn+1 is consistent
with T . Therefore ǫ0p0 ∧ . . . ∧ ǫn+1pn+1 is consistent with T and thus ǫ0p0 ∧ . . . ∧ ǫn+1pn+1
belongs to T . In particular pn+1 ∈ T , a contradiction. Therefore the set of generating
default rules for T is infinite and determines a branch through treeW . Thus T is a complete
theory containing W . This completes the proof. ✷
6 Representability with Closed World Assumption
Next, we explore the connections of normal default logic with the Closed World Assumption.
Consider a set of atoms P . Define the set of defaults
DCWA
P
=
{
:¬p
¬p
: p ∈ P
}
.
Informally, a default :¬p¬p allows us to derive ¬p if p is not derivable. This has the flavor of
the Closed World Assumption. The exact connection with CWA is given by the following
result [MT93]: If P = At then W is CWA-consistent if and only if (DCWA
P
,W ) possesses
a unique consistent extension.
Theorem 6.1 For every normal default theory (D,W ) in L there exists a language L′ ⊇ L,
a set of atoms P in L′, and W ′ ⊆ L′ such that (D,W ) is semi-equivalent to a default theory
(DCWA
P
,W ′).
Proof: By Theorem 3.1 we can assume that all defaults in D are prerequisite-free. Let Ψ
be the set of consequents of defaults in D. For each ψ ∈ Ψ select a new atom not belonging
to At (recall that At is the set of atoms in L). This atom is denoted by pψ and the set P
is defined as {pψ : ψ ∈ Ψ}. Define now L
′ to be the language generated by the set of atoms
At′ = At ∪ P . Next, define V as this set of formulas:
{¬pψ ⇔ ψ:ψ ∈ Ψ}.
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We notice the following fact:
(F1) Let Φ ⊆ Ψ. Then W ∪ Φ is consistent if and only if W ∪ V ∪ {¬pψ : ψ ∈ Φ} is
consistent.
Indeed, for a model v of W ∪ Φ, define v′ as follows:
v′(p) =
{
v(p) if p ∈ At
1− v(ψ) if p = pψ
It is clear that v′ is a model of W ∪ V ∪ {¬pψ : ψ ∈ Φ}. Conversely, when v
′, a valuation
of At′ is a model of W ∪ V ∪ {¬pψ : ψ ∈ Φ} then v = v
′|At is a model of W ∪ {ψ : ψ ∈ Φ}.
Hence, (F1) follows.
Observation (F1) implies that Φ is a maximal subset of Ψ consistent with W if and only
if {¬pψ : ψ ∈ Φ} is a maximal subset of {¬pψ : ψ ∈ Φ} which is consistent with W ∪ V .
Next, observe that if Φ is a maximal set of formulas contained in Ψ and consistent with
W then for all θ ∈ Ψ \Φ
W ∪ V ∪ {¬pψ : ψ ∈ Φ} ⊢ pθ.
We are now ready to construct the desired default theory. We put W ′ = W ∪ V and
D′ = {
:¬pψ
¬pψ
: ψ ∈ Ψ}. Clearly, D′ = CWAP . Using the observations listed above, we will
now show that the theory (D′,W ′) semi-represents ext(D,W ).
We will apply Theorem 4.21 of [MT93]. In order to apply this result, we need to show
that whenever Φ ⊆ Ψ is a maximal subset of Ψ consistent with W then T = Cn(W ∪ V ∪
{¬pψ : ψ ∈ Φ}) is inclusion-minimal and ⊑P -minimal among theories that are complete
with respect to P . In addition, we need to show that, Cn(W ∪Φ) = T ∩ L.
To this end, we proceed as follows. When Φ is a maximal subset of Ψ consistent with W
then, by the above fact, {¬pψ : ψ ∈ Φ} is a maximal subset of {¬pψ : ψ ∈ Φ} consistent with
W ∪V . Thus {pφ : φ ∈ Ψ\Φ} is a minimal set of atoms in a theory T which containsW ∪V .
Moreover, among such theories Cn(W ∪ V ∪ {¬pψ : ψ ∈ Φ}) is clearly inclusion-minimal.
Moreover, by the argument used in the proof of (F1) we have:
Cn(W ∪ V ∪ {¬pψ : ψ ∈ Ψ}) ∩ L = Cn(W ∪ Φ)
Thus the extensions of (D,W ) are restrictions to L of extensions of (D′,W ′). It is easy to
see that such extension of (D′,W ′) is unique.
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In order to apply Theorem 4.21 we also need to prove the converse statement, that is,
that if T is complete with respect to P , T contains W ∪ V , T is ⊑-minimal with these
properties, and ΦT = {ψ : ψ ∈ Ψ} ∩ T , then ΦT is consistent with W and is maximal
among the subsets of Φ with this property, T = Cn(W ∪ V = {¬pψ : ψ ∈ ΦT }) and
Cn(W ∪ ΦT ) = T ∩ L. Since the argument is entirely analogous to the one used above, we
omit the details. ✷
7 Conclusions
The concepts studied in this paper, representability and equivalence, are of key importance
for default logic and its applications. Representability provides insights into the expressive
power of default logic, while equivalence provides normal form results for default logic,
allowing the user to find simpler representations for his/her default theories.
In this paper we characterized those families of theories that can be represented by
default theories with a finite set of defaults (Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.3). However, we
have not found a characterization of families of theories that are representable by default
theories with an infinite set of defaults. This problem seems to be much more difficult and
remains open. In the paper, we present two countable families that are not representable
and completely solved the representability problem if inifintary defaults are allowed.
We also studied representability by means of normal default theories. Here, our results
are complete. Corollary 5.2 provides a full description of families of theories that are
collections of extensions of normal default theories.
Another notion studied in the paper was equivalence of default theories. We showed
(Theorem 3.1) that for every normal default theory there exists a normal default theory con-
sisting of prerequisite-free defaults and having exactly the same extensions as the original
one. We also exhibited some cases when, for a given normal default theory, an equiva-
lent normal default theory can be found with empty objective part. Finding a complete
description of normal default theories for which it is possible remains an open problem.
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